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COMMENT
The Physician as Entrepreneur: State and Federal Restrictions
on Physician Joint Ventures
I. INTRODUCnON
Doctors in private practice had good reason to feel threatened by
changes in the American health care market in the 1980s. They saw
the growing popularity of health maintenance organizations, preferred
provider organizations, and other alternative deliveiy systems.' They
felt the pinch of a more cost-conscious federal government that
changed the basis of Medicare payments for inpatient procedures to a
Prospective Payment System.' At the same time, new technologies
emerged that could be used effectively in non-hospital settings. 3 This
confluence of trends provided the setting for investors who sought to
attract physicians to invest in freestanding facilities providing services
such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and clinical laboratory
tests.4 Physicians were attractive to investors as sources of future re-
1. Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Evidence on Complex Structures of Physician Joint
Ventures, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 489,489 (1992); John K. Iglehart, The Debate Over Physician
Ownership of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 198, 203-04 (1989).
2. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Finan-
cial Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses (1989), reprinted in
[1989-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 37,838, at 19,925-26
[hereinafter OIG Report]. Under the Prospective Payment System (PPS), a physician is
reimbursed according to a predetermined "average" cost per patient, based on the pa-
tient's condition. Since this limitation only applies to in-hospital services, PPS encouraged
the use of outpatient facilities. Christian D. Humphreys, Comment, Regulation of Physi-
cian Self-ReferraL" Is Prohibition the Answer or Has Congress Operated on the Wrong Pa-
tient?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 161, 162 (1993) (citing David A. Hyman & Joel V.
Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a "Competitive" Health Care Era,
19 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1133, 1138-39 (1988)). See generally Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 499, 505-12 (1990) (explaining effects of PPS on provision of health care services).
3. OIG Report, supra note 2, at 19,926.
4. Freestanding joint venture facilities funded by outside investors and physicians
have attracted the most attention from critics, and the problems associated with these facil-
ities will be the focus of this Comment. See infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text. See
generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST 73-79 (1993) (describing other kinds of joint ventures in which physicians
have invested); Robert A. Metry, Physician Ventures, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY
(Qualified Plans, PCS and Welfare Benefits), March 1, 1990, at 509, 511, available in
WESTLAW, TP-ALL database, C472 ALI-ABA *509, *511 (1990) ("A joint venture can
be virtually any relationship between a physician (or group of physicians) and any other
party, such as a hospital clinic, equipment lessor, or independent sponsor, whose purpose is
to derive a profit from a joint business endeavor.").
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ferrals. Orthopedic surgeons, for instance, frequently refer patients to
outside facilities for x-rays and imaging services. Investors would seek
these surgeons to become limited partners in MRI centers because of
the stream of referrals that would likely result from their personal in-
terests in the facility.5 A physician's channeling of patients to a facil-
ity in which he owns an interest, known as "physician self-referral,"
has become highly controversial.6
Some physicians defend self-referral because their medical exper-
tise and awareness of patients' needs arguably place physicians in the
best position to evaluate the demand for new medical technologies.
7
More frequently, supporters of self-referral argue that physicians
ought to be able to provide the capital for needed facilities, especially
when other investors will not.8 One doctor in Texas, for example, be-
5. See Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 492-93.
6. Self-referral has been a particularly contentious subject within the medical profes-
sion. Dana Priest, AMA Decrees "Self-Referral" is Unethical, WASH. Posr, Dec. 9, 1992, at
Al (quoting American Medical Association Chairman Raymond Scalettar, who described
the debate over self-referral as "lacerating and divisive"). The American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) opposed legislation in 1989 regulating self-referral, but in 1991 its Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommended some restrictions. In June 1992 the organiza-
tion's House of Delegates rejected those recommendations, but six months later it reversed
itself and adopted them. For a more detailed discussion of the AMA's response to the
problem, see RODWIN, supra note 4, at 44-45, and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Am. Med. Ass'n, Conflicts of Interest: Physician Ownership of Medical Facilities, 267
JAMA 2366, 2366 (1992) [hereinafter Council Report].
On state medical societies' responses to self-referral, see Brian McCormick, AMA,
State Society on Opposite Sides, AM. MED. NEws, June 1, 1992, at 1 (discussing the rift
between New Jersey's medical society and the AMA); Brian McCormick, Self-Referral Tug
of War: Ethical Policy vs. State Politics, A . MED. Nnws, Apr. 27, 1992, at 3 (comparing
AMA's position with that of Florida Medical Association).
7. Council Report, supra note 6, at 2368; see also Physician Ownership and Referral
Arrangements: Hearings on H.R. 345 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (state-
ment of Dr. Nancy W. Dickey, Member, Board of Trustees, AMA) (suggesting that physi-
cians first recognized the value of MRI technology); Bernhard Heersink, Letter to the
Editor, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1989) (arguing that doctors can best determine
patients' needs for services).
8. E.g., 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 201 (testimony of Dr. Nancy W. Dickey,
Member, Board of Trustees, AMA) ("Many facilities would not be available in some com-
munities but for physician ownership. Patient benefit and patient access to health care
facilities must be of primary concern in enacting self-referral legislation."). A representa-
tive of the American College of Radiology testified to the contrary that physician-investors
often do not contribute the capital that allows a facility to be built; rather, "[m]ost often
referring physicians' participation in these joint ventures involves only signing a note for
debt .... We do not believe that these joint ventures are created because there is no
money in town." 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 293 (statement of Dr. Karl K. Wallace, Jr.,
Chairman, Board of Chancellors, American College of Radiology). For a discussion of
federal treatment of facilities in which physician-investors have contributed little capital,
see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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came a limited partner in an MRI center near his practice because he
felt that local hospitals were not providing adequate imaging and radi-
ology services to outpatients. These patients "were forced to wait ex-
tended periods of time, frequently over-night, pay extra for call-back
technologists, or... make return visits of 50-200 miles to get the serv-
ices .... "9 The doctor asserted that the imaging center in which he
invested eliminated these significant delays. 10
Critics of self-referral fear that physicians who self-refer put
themselves in a dangerous position. Having an interest in a facility
may lead tham consciously or unconsciously, to recommend more
tests than are necessary." In this way, self-referral may present a con-
flict of interest for physicians, as their own pecuniary interests com-
pete with the financial interests of their patients. 12 Furtherinore, self-
referral may adversely affect the health care market. Excessive testing
clearly wastes health care dollars. Self-referral may also have the ef-
fect of squeezing competing facilities out of the market.'3 A facility
9. Issues Related to Physician "Self-Referrals". Hearings on H.R. 939 Before the Sub-
comm. on Health and Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1989) (statement of AMA) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings].
10. Id.
11. As one critic put it,
it is often difficult if not impossible to distinguish cases in which financial gain
does have improper influence from those in which it does not. It is difficult even
in one's own case, and all the more so in the case of people one does not know
personally, to determine what motives have influenced a professional decision.
Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEw ENO. J. MED.
573, 574-75 (1993). Most critics of self-referral are far more suspicious of the motives of
physicians who self-refer. In the 1980s, one doctor concluded that "greed became the dom-
inant motive [for these investments]. There were many unscrupulous dollar jockeys and
wheeler-dealers to broker deals .... There was squabbling. One doctor would say, 'I
referred X patients and Harry only referred half that many. Shouldn't I get more money?'
" Charles R. Babcock, Defending Physician Self-Referrals, WASH. POST, July 7, 1993, at
A19 (quoting Dr. Stanley L. Malkin).
12. Scholar Marc Rodwin argues that doctors should be held to the same high stan-
dards as other professionals:
The law holds financial advisers, brokers, dealers and others accountable as fidu-
ciaries. Because of their position of trust, such persons are required to act in their
clients' interests rather than their own. The conflicts of interest among these
groups are dealt with by numerous rules against the abuse of that trust. Physi-
cians, who now have nearly free rein, should be held to the same high standards
in the market for their services.
Marc A. Rodwin, Letter to the Editor, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1989).
13. For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina, investors and physicians opened a new
radiation care center, provoking the owners of the other radiation care center in the city to
complain, "[h]ow can we hope to compete on the basis of cost, quality or convenience of
care when a large subset of our referring physicians stand to financially benefit from a
referral to their own facility?" Karen Garloch, Doctor Investments in Medical Centers
Prompt Ethics Debate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 1992, at 1A (quoting Dr. Robert
Fraser).
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that gets a "lock" on referrals stands a good chance of driving others
out of the market, regardless of the price or quality of services
provided. 4
This Comment first describes some of the types of joint ventures
in which physicians invested during the 1980s, showing how they have
been structured to reward physicians for making referrals.s It then
describes the major studies that provide evidence of the extent and
effects of physician self-referral.1 6 After discussing the federal re-
sponses to the proliferation of physician joint ventures,'17 this Com-
ment focuses on the highly varied state responses to the issue, because
state legislation has received relatively scant attention in the academic
literature.' 8 The Comment discusses the strengths and weaknesses of
state legislation, the interaction of state and federal law, and finally
the continuing need for state legislation.
II. PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP AND REFERRAL PATrERNS
A. Structures of Joint Ventures
To appreciate the controversy surrounding physician self-referral,
it is necessary to understand the business structures of physician joint
ventures.' 9 The simplest may be a limited partnership in which physi-
14. The executive director of Quality Imaging Association (QIA) testified regarding
the validity of these concerns: "Centers operated by QIA members have been told that the
quality of services they offered was irrelevant because the physician would refer only to the
facility in which he had an ownership interest." 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 283-84
(statement of Richard E. Geier, Executive Director, QIA). QIA commissioned a report
which concluded that overutilization of imaging tests by physicians who owned interests in
imaging centers cost the health care system $258 million in 1992 alone. Id. at 284.
15. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 54-121 and accopmanying text. Federal legislation has been given
significant attention in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Pamela L. Gorski, The Big Chill:
Safe Harbors in the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Statutes, 5 J.L. & HEALTH
237 (1990-91); Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 494-499; John J. Farley, Note, The Medi-
care Antifraud Statute and Safe Harbor Regulations: Suggestions for Change, 81 GEo. L.J.
167 (1992); Humphreys, supra note 2, at 167-79; Kimberly A. King, Comment, Regulating
Physician Investment and Referral Behavior in the Competitive Health Care Marketplace of
the '90s-An Argument for Decentralization, 65 WASH. L. REv. 657,657-62 (1990); Carolyn
M. Pengidore, Note, Dubious Practice? The Storm Over Physician Self-Referral, 31 Duo.
L. REv. 167, 168-87 (1992). This Comment will not consider antitrust issues related to
physician joint ventures. For an overview of potential antitrust problems, see Susan
Tedrick, Legal Issues in Physician Self-Referral and Other Health Care Business Relation-
ships, 13 ". LEGAL MED. 521, 542-48 (1992).
18. See infra notes 122-97 and accompanying text. E.g., Mitchell & Scott, supra note
1, at 500-01; Tedrick, supra note 17, at 552-53; Humphreys, supra note 2, at 179-81;
Pengidore, supra note 17, at 187-89.
19. Physician joint ventures have three defining characteristics, according to Marc
Rodwin: "(1) the physician earns money only if the facility is profitable; (2) the physician
296 [Vol. 73
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cians are limited partners and outside investors are general partners
who manage the business.2" Outside investors may join with physi-
cians who specialize in internal medicine, for instance, to form a lim-
ited partnership clinical laboratory. According to the partnership
agreement, the physicians would be required to contribute only capi-
tal, but it would be understood that they would refer patients to the
facility. As limited partners, physicians would not be involved in the
management of the lab in any significant way, and thus would not be
in a position to affect the quality or cost of the lab's services.
Researchers Jean Mitchell and Ellen Scott observed a more com-
plex partnership that owned an ambulatory service center, a clinical
laboratory, and a durable medical equipment business.21 The partners
were two corporations, one of which was owned by outside investors
and the other by 200 separate corporations. 2 Each of the 200 corpo-
rations was owned by just one stockholder-a physician.' This kind
of arrangement disguises the identity of the investors and, in some
states, evades self-referral legislation.24
Apart from their varying degrees of complexity, joint ventures
can be divided into two important categories: those that require sig-
nificant capital investment from investing physicians and those that do
can enhance the venture's profitability by referring patients, ordering equipment, or using
the facility's services; and (3) the physician, acting as a clinician, either chooses or recom-
mends the services that the facility provides." RoDwIN, supra note 4, at 67; see also Ross
E. STROMBERG & CAROL R. BOMAN, JOINT VENTURES FOR HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS:
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 15-35, 193-241 (1986) (detailing possible structures for joint ven-
tures involving hospitals and physicians).
20. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 67-68. A study conducted by the Office of the In-
spector General found that 25% of health care joint ventures with physician owners were
set up as partnerships, as compared to 4% of health care joint ventures without physician-
investors. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 129 (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspec-
tor General of the Department of Health and Human Services).
21. Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, New Evidence of the Prevalence and Scope of
Physician Joint Ventures, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 80, 81 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Researchers Mitchell and Scott found that complex ownership arrangements were
significantly more common in joint ventures with physician-investors than in companies
without them. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 513. Complex ownership structures gen-
erally serve to isolate risk for independent operating units of a larger corporation. Com-
plex ownership structures generally do not serve that purpose for joint venture medical
service facilities, because the facilities are usually independent businesses. Mitchell &
Scott, supra note 1, at 512. This evidence suggests that investors are attempting to avoid
self-referral legislation through indirect ownership arrangements. See id.
Some state self-referral statutes still do not explicitly deal with indirect investment
interests. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. The most recent federal self-referral
legislation, commonly known as Stark II, brings indirect ownership arrangements within
the purview of the statute. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
1994]
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not?. 5 The ventures that have drawn the most criticism fall into the
latter category, promising high rates of return on very small invest-
ments.26 An Ohio corporation, for instance, sought physician-inves-
tors for a facility providing intravenous services. Interested physicians
would be required to invest $15,000, but only $100 in cash. The re-
mainder could be funded by a bank loan at one percent above prime.
The prospectus clearly documented the organizers' goal:
The organizers believe that physicians will be more likely to
refer patients to the corporation if the physician owns an in-
terest in the corporation .... [T]he ability of the corporation
to compete successfully with other entities will depend upon
the corporation's ability to secure a large number of referrals
from physician-investors.2 7
The profit distributions to referring physicians look very much like
payments for referrals, or "kickbacks," in these circumstances. 28
The other kind of joint venture arrangement, in contrast, requires
investing physicians to contribute significant amounts of capital. In
Gainesville, Florida, for instance, a group of urologists invested
$20,000 each to raise $1 million in equity and borrowed $3 million to
set up a center providing lithotripsy services.2 9 The doctors asserted
that the facility made the technology more accessible and less expen-
sive for many patients in the area, but that other investors had not
been interested in funding the facility.30 Critics find these arrange-
ments troubling because financial incentives to overutilize the facility
25. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 68.
26. Id. at 71. One letter seeking physician investors began: "Dear Doctor, Would you
pass up the opportunity to increase your office revenue by an amount of anywhere from
$35,000 to $200,000/year after a relatively minimal investment?" RODWIN, supra note 4, at
71.
27. 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 194 (testimony of Marc Rodwin). Other evidence
that investors primarily seek referrals can be found in some of the prospectuses submitted
to the Office of the Inspector General as part of its 1989 study of physician self-referral.
Of the 30 offerings and prospectuses, for instance, 12 stated that the stock or units of
partnerships were only being offered to physicians, 5 required divestiture of a physician's
interest upon his retirement from active practice, and 5 required divestiture if the physician
left the immediate area. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 129. Another offering made to
physicians located close to the proposed facility sought a $4000 initial investment and
promised annual returns of 300 percent. Id. at 130.
28. The Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute prohibits kickbacks for referrals of
Medicare patients. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
29. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 493. Lithotripsy, also known as lithotrity, is the
crushing of a stone in the bladder or urethra. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 888 (25th
ed. 1990).
30. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 493.
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remain and because the investing physicians so frequently lack control
over the quality or cost of care provided.3'
B. Extent of Physician Ownership
Before 1989, few studies had examined physician ownership and
referral patterns.32 That year the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) published the first major study to document the prevalence of
physician self-referral.33 The OIG estimated that about twelve per-
cent of physicians billing Medicare owned a direct investment interest
in a facility to which they referred patients.34 Three years later, an
AMA survey found that only eight percent of physicians owned an
interest in private health care facilities.35 Those figures hide the con-
centration of physician ownership in certain kinds of facilities. The
OIG found, for example, that twenty-five percent of all independent
clinical laboratories and twenty-seven percent of all independent
physiological labs were owned by referring physicians.
36
Researchers in Florida who conducted one of the largest studies
of self-referral to date found ownership to be far more widespread in
that state in 1990.37 The study showed that forty to forty-six percent
of physicians in Florida owned an interest in a joint venture, and that
ownership was highly concentrated in a few medical specialties. Re-
ferring physicians owned, in whole or in part, over ninety percent of
all diagnostic imaging centers, over seventy-five percent of all ambula-
31. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
32. Several studies of self-referral, had been conducted in Michigan during the 1980s.
0IG Report, supra note 2, at 19,927. A 1981 study found that Medicaid recipients referred
by physician-investors received 41% more tests than those referred by non-investors. Id.
A 1984 study found that clinical laboratories with physician-investors provided 40% more
services than laboratories without physician-investors. Id.
33. Id. at 19,925, 19,929.
34. Id. at 19,931-32. The OIG's estimate was conservative because it did not take into
account ownership interests held through family members or through parent companies.
1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 129. The study concluded that 15% of physicians billing
Medicare had some sort of compensation arrangement with an entity to which they re-
ferred patients. Id.
35. The AMA collected data between 1988 and 1992. It found that physician owner-
ship in private facilities to which they referred patients declined from 9.3% in 1988 to
about 8% in 1992. The surveys also showed that three-fourths of physicians who owned an
interest in a facility referred patients to the facility in 1988, while less than two-thirds did so
in 1992. 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 218-20 (submitting report with testimony of
AMA).
36. OIG Report, supra note 2, at 19,932.
37. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 21, at 83 (describing STATE OF FLORIDA HEALTH
CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, JOINT VENTURES AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
IN FLORIDA (1991)).
1994]
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tory surgical facilities, and about half of the radiation therapy centers
and clinical laboratories in the state.38
Other populous states have similar ownership patterns. In Cali-
fornia, for instance, more than eighty-five percent of freestanding
imaging centers are wholly or partly owned by referring physicians.39
In New Jersey, at least seventy-five percent of the freestanding imag-
ing centers have ownership arrangements involving referring
physicians.4"
C. Effects of Self-Referral
The fact that significant numbers of physicians own facilities to
which they refer patients means little without an inquiry into the ef-
fects of self-referral on the quantity, quality, and cost of care provided
to patients. The clearest finding of the studies is that physician-inves-
tors refer patients for services provided at facilities in which they own
interests more frequently than noninvesting physicians refer patients
for similar services. The OIG's 1989 study, for instance, showed that
Medicare patients treated by doctors who owned interests in clinical
laboratories received forty-five percent more clinical laboratory serv-
ices than Medicare patients in general.41 Researchers in California
found that physician owners of physical therapy centers referred pa-
tients for physical therapy more than twice as often as other physi-
cians.42 A study of radiation therapy showed that patients with similar
symptoms were at least four times more likely to have diagnostic
imaging performed if a physician self-referred.43 The most recent
study by the Health Care Finance Administration reveals an addi-
tional link between the cost of a test and the likelihood that a physi-
cian owner will refer for the test. Physicians with interests in imaging
38. Id. at 83-84. The Florida study also found that 91% of physicians who invested in
facilities were in areas of practice that were likely to refer for ancillary services, such as
internal medicine, general practice, surgery, and orthopedics. Id. at 82.
39. Id. at 84. These percentages may have decreased since 1992, when researchers
Mitchell and Scott reported them.
40. Id.
41. OIG Report, supra note 2, at 19,933. The study found great variation among the
states. 1989 Hearings, supra note 9, at 130. In West Virginia and New York, for instance,
patients referred by physician-owners were not likely to have more tests performed, while
in California, they were likely to have 30% more tests, and in Michigan, 87% more. Id.
42. Alex Swedlow et al., Increased Costs and Rates of Use in the California Workers'
Compensation System as a Result of Self-Referral by Physicians, 327 NEw ENO. J. MED.
1502, 1503-04 (1992). Physical therapy is big business in California, accounting for 56% of
all outpatient procedures for the treatment of injured workers in 1990. Id. at 1504.
43. Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Prac-
tice, A Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEw ENo.
J. MED. 1604, 1606 (1990).
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centers, the study shows, referred for costly MRIs fifty percent more
frequently than other physicians, yet referred for simple X-rays only
two percent more often." The inference one is tempted to draw from
the studies is that physicians with ownership interests in facilities
overutilize those facilities, particularly when it provides more expen-
sive services.
The studies do not, however, necessarily prove that conclusion.45
They do not take into account, for instance, physicians' different levels
of knowledge of tests and services. Doctors who own an interest in a
particular facility may be more informed about the services performed
there and for that reason refer patients there more frequently.' Fur-
thermore, these studies do not investigate whether the greater number
of tests and services provided at joint venture facilities reduce overall
health care costs per patient. Early diagnostic tests, for instance, may
allow physicians to treat patients most effectively and economically in
the long term.47 The authors of several studies admit that they do not
know whether investing or non-investing physicians use services more
appropriately.48
At least two studies strongly suggest that self-referring physicians
are overutilizing their facilities. In one, researchers compared radia-
tion therapy referrals in Florida to radiation therapy referrals in the
rest of the country. Forty-four percent of radiation therapy centers in
Florida are physician joint ventures, as compared to seven percent in
the rest of the nation.49 After controlling for age and other variables,
researchers found that the number of radiation-therapy procedures in
Florida was fifty-eight percent higher per 1000 Medicare patients than
44. 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 151 (statement of Janet L. Shikles, Director, Health
Financing and Policy Issues, Human Resources Division, U.S. General Accounting Office).
These figures suggest that self-referral is particularly likely when expensive technology is
involved.
45. Jean Mitchell, one of the authors of the Florida study, admitted that "[w]e couldn't
determine whether use was inappropriate. We can only say it was higher than non-joint
venture facilities." Laurie Jones, Stark Wants to Expand Ban on Self-Referral Beyond
Labs, AM. MED. NEws, Nov. 4, 1991, at 1, 32.
46. See 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 157 (statement of Rep. Bill Thomas) (sug-
gesting that "people who have investigated and decided to spend money in it would proba-
bly have a higher knowledge of its uses and potentials.., and that therefore as a diagnostic
tool they might see it as more useful").
47. See id. at 157-58.
48. Hillman, supra note 43, at 1608; Jones, supra note 45, at 32.
49. Jean M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Consequences of Physicians' Ownership
of Health Care Facilities-Joint Ventures in Radiation Therapy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1497, 1498-99 (1992). Radiation therapy for cancer is somewhat standardized, so treatment
does not vary tremendously across the country as the result of different approaches. Id. at
1498.
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in the rest of the nation, but that fifty-four percent of the patients with
cancer died in Florida, as opposed to fifty-three percent nationwide.-5
The extensive use of radiation therapy in Florida thus appears to have
produced few health benefits for state residents.51 A recent study in
California focused on MRI referrals covered by workers' compensa-
tion. Researchers found that self-referring physicians recommended
medically inappropriate scans in thirty-eight percent of the cases ex-
amined, while other physicians did so in only twenty-eight percent of
the cases. 52 These studies bolster the others that reveal such a striking
correlation between ownership and a high level of referrals.
While definitive evidence about overuse is limited, evidence
about quality of care at joint venture facilities is even more scarce. In
one study, researchers compared the care given at joint venture physi-
cal therapy centers to that provided at non-joint venture centers.
They found that facilities with physician owners provided fewer min-
utes of care per patient and less overall care by licensed therapists.
53
The implication of this study is that facilities with physician owners
provided lower quality care. The researchers did not, however, com-
pare the results achieved at physician joint venture facilities with
those achieved at non-joint venture facilities, and thus a meaningful
comparison of the relative quality of care cannot be made. Few stud-
ies examine the issue of quality of care, and none have yet proven that
facilities with physician investors get a "lock" on referrals and subse-
quently provide substandard care.
The studies, taken as a whole, do not definitively prove that phy-
sician joint ventures lead to a distortion of the market or to lower
quality care. Instead, most prove only a strong correlation between a
physician's ownership interest in a facility and the likelihood that she
will refer patients for the type of services provided at the facility more
frequently than other physicians. The fundamental question posed by
the studies is whether we should take the chance that the clear link
between ownership and referral does not imply overutilization of tests
and services. The federal government has been increasingly unwilling
to take that gamble.
50. Id. at 1499.
51. See id. at 1500. The researchers concluded that "joint ventures must be regarded
as a likely explanation for the high levels of use and costs characteristic of Florida." Id.
52. Swedlow et al., supra note 42, at 1504.
53. Jean M. Mitchell & Elton Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services:




III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
A. Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
To regulate self-referral, the federal government first used old
legislation in a new way. The Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute
(the "Anti-Fraud Statute"), enacted in 1972,14 was designed to deal
with abuses of the Medicare reimbursement system.5 5 In part, the
statute made it illegal for medical testing facilities to make payments
to physicians who referred patients to the facilities.5 6 These payments
for referrals, or "kickbacks," encouraged physicians to order more
tests and services than were necessary.57 Specifically, the statute pro-
hibited a person or entity from knowingly and willfully offering or
paying any remuneration directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, to
any person, to "induce" that person to refer patients for the furnishing
of medical services.
58
In its 1985 case against physician and entrepreneur Alvin Greber,
the Justice Department advanced a broad interpretation of that lan-
guage.5 9 Greber had formed a corporation called Cardio-Med to per-
form diagnostic tests on patients referred to the facility." Cardio-
Med billed Medicare for the services it performed, and forwarded part
of the payment fee it received to the referring physician.6' Greber
claimed that the money paid to referring physicians was not intended
to induce them to refer future patients, but to compensate them for
interpreting the tests and explaining test results to patients.62 The
government argued that the payments to the referring physicians con-
stituted kickbacks within the meaning of the Anti-Fraud Statute-
54. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 242(b),(c), 278(b)(8)-
(a), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419-20 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
55. See generally Farley, supra note 17, at 168-71 (discussing the impetus behind the
original legislation and the amendments to the statute).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also Theodore N. McDow-
ell, Comment, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments: Their Impact
on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY LJ. 691, 715-20 (1987) (discussing the nega-
tive impact of federal legislation on the Medicare-Medicaid health care system).
57. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68,71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985)
("Congress intended to combat financial incentives to physicians for ordering particular
services patients did not require."). Criminal penalties alone could be levied against both
providers and doctors and included up to five years in prison and fines up to $25,000. See
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Accordingly, enforcement of the statute
fell squarely within the province of the Department of Justice.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
59. Greber, 760 F.2d at 71-72.
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even if they were paid for purposes other than inducing referrals-so
long as one purpose of the payments was to encourage future refer-
rals. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, reading the statute
expansively.63
Congress followed the lead of the Justice Department several
years later when it first suggested that illegal remuneration under the
Anti-Fraud Statute could also take place through physician joint ven-
tures. Based on the presumption that referrals could be induced by
profit distributions from a joint venture in the same way they were
induced by more direct kickcbacks, Congress required the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) to publish a list of "safe harbors"
describing the kinds of joint venture arrangements that would not vio-
late the Anti-Fraud Statute. '4
1. The Fraud Alert
The OIG first responded to the Congressional mandate by releas-
ing a Fraud Alert in 1989 outlining joint venture financing arrange-
ments that are "suspect" under the Anti-Fraud laws. 65 The OIG
indicated that two types of initial investments from physician-inves-
tors will provoke further scrutiny of the venture; nominal capital con-
tribution's and those consisting of a loan from the entity. Suspicious
profit distribution arrangements require disproportionately small in-
vestments from physicians and promise them extremely large returns,
or pay physicians extraordinary returns on their investment compared
to the associated risks.66
63. See id. at 69. The First and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals and a district court in
Texas have followed the Greber interpretation of the Anti-Fraud Statute. See United
States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 20,29 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The
gravamen of Medicare Fraud is inducement.... We are impressed by the Third Circuit's
reasoning .... "); United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Greber,
760 F.2d at 71) ("Greber's interpretation is consistent with the legislative history ....
'[E]ven if the physician performs some service for the money received, the potential for
unnecessary drain on the Medicare system remains.' "); Polk County v. Peters, 800 F. Supp.
1451, 1454-55 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (Mem.) (citing Greber, Kats, and Bay State).
64. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, 101 Stat. 680, 697 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b note (Supp. IV 1992)).
The 1987 Act also added civil penalties to the statute, giving the Department of Health and
Human Services the power to fine violators and to exclude them from reimbursement from
Medicare and Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7,1320a-7a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In 1988,
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act mandated an OIG study of physician self-refer-
ral, and the resulting report was submitted to Congress in May of 1989. Metry, supra note
4, at *516.
65. Metry, supra note 4, at *667 (providing text of Fraud Alert).
66. Id. at *668.
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The Fraud Alert also identifies suspect methods of selecting and
retaining physician-investors. 67 If outside investors choose physicians
because they are in a position to make referrals, or if they offer partic-
ularly lucrative arrangements to those physicians expected to make a
high volume of referrals, investors may be violating the Anti-Fraud
Statute.68 Similarly, if outside investors actively encourage physicians
to refer patients to the facility, limit their ability to transfer their inter-
est, require divestment of their interest upon relocation, or track and
distribute the numbers of referrals per physician-investor, the invest-
ment may be subject to scrutiny. 69
2. The Hanlester Network Case
Several years before the issuance of the Fraud Alert, the
Hanlester Network investors in California unabashedly sought physi-
cian-investors to provide a consistently large stream of referrals to
clinical laboratories the Network was establishing.70 They deliber-
ately targeted as potential investors physicians who regularly ordered
outpatient tests.71 The investors required physicians to make a mini-
mal investment-only $1500-and promised extremely high returns in
private placement memoranda.72 One investor told physicians that
their returns could be as high as 300 to 400 percent annually and that
physicians who failed to refer a high volume of patients would be
pressured to increase their numbers or withdraw their investment.73
The OIG commenced a high-profile suit against the investors in 1991,
arguing that they unlawfully induced referrals by giving physicians
"the opportunity to own shares in the laboratories and to share in the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Alert also explains how certain business structures may violate the Anti-
Fraud Statute. Id. The use of a "shell" laboratory, for instance, is illegal under the statute.
Id. A shell lab is set up in order to bill Medicare for work done at another lab in which a
physician owns an interest. Id. A physician would employ a shell lab to bill Medicare
because other federal legislation prevents a physician from billing Medicare for services
performed at a lab when he owns an interest in the lab. See infra notes 98-108 and accom-
panying text.
70. For a good summary of the strategies of these investors and the subsequent litiga-
tion, see David Azevedo, Joint Ventures Become Even Riskier, MIm. ECON., July 26, 1993,
at 36. The facts of the case are set out more comprehensively in Inspector General v.
Hanlester Network, [1991 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,034
(Mar. 1, 1991).
71. Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, [1992-2 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) I 40,406B, at 31,783 (July 24, 1992).
72. Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, [1992-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566, at 27,742 (Sept. 18, 1991).
73. Id.
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laboratories' profits where ... the partners were 'virtually guaranteed'
a high rate of return on their investments, so long as they referred
laboratory tests to the joint ventures."'74 The administrative law judge
initially held for the investors,7" but the Appellate Board agreed with
the OIG that referrals had been unlawfully induced. 76 A federal dis-
trict court in California ruled in favor of the OIG in February of
1993.77 This case is significant because it was the first to test the
OIG's interpretation of the Anti-Fraud Statute as set forth in the
Fraud Alert. The Hanlester Network investors engaged in most of the
conduct identified in the Fraud Alert as problematic. This case should
give physicians and investors particularly strong incentives to attend
to the Fraud Alert.78
3. Safe Harbors
In addition to its commencement of the Hanlester Network suit,
the OIG issued "safe harbors," as required by Congress, describing
joint venture arrangements that will not be subject to Anti-Fraud scru-
tiny.79 The "large entity" safe harbor allows a physician to refer
Medicare patients to a facility that is part of a large corporation in
which he owns an interest.8 0 The "small entity" safe harbor protects
physicians who self-refer when no more than forty percent of the facil-
ity is owned by persons in a position to make referrals and no more
than forty percent of its revenues come from referrals from inves-
tors.8' Other requirements also must be met for protection under
74. Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, [1991 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH), 39,094, at 25,523 (Mar. 1, 1991).
75. Id. at 25,510-11.
76. Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, [1992-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) 39,566 at 27,740 (Sept. 18, 1991).
77. Hanlester Network v. Sullivan, [1993-1 'ransfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 41,076, at 34,723 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 1993).
78. If the decision stands, "the Inspector General will have won a broad new definition
of his power to prosecute doctors and their non-physician business partners" for offenses
involving Medicare referrals. Azevedo, supra note 70, at 36.
79. See Howard Larkin, Most Joint Ventures Unlikely to be in a 'Safe Harbor', AM.
MED. NEws, Aug. 26, 1991, at 11; Sharon Mclrath, New Safe Harbor Rules Narrow, AM.
MED. NEws, Aug. 12,1991, at 1. However, Deputy Inspector General Larry Morey argued
that "even though the safe harbors are narrow, they have a chilling effect on prosecutors,
who may be reluctant to take a case which may involve a colorable claim that a safe harbor
applies." 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 169.
80. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(1) (1993). The net assets of the corporation must have
exceeded $50 million in the previous year and its securities must be registered on a na-
tional exchange. Id.
81. Id. § 1001.952(a)(2)(i), (vi). Also, there must not be any requirement that a pas-




either safe harbor: a physician's return on his investment cannot be
based on the volume of his referrals, only the amount of his capital
contribution;82 investment opportunities must be offered to non-refer-
ring investors and referring investors on equal terms;83 the joint ven-
ture entity cannot make a loan or guarantee a loan that enables the
physician to acquire an interest in the corporation;8 4 and the entity
cannot market its services or products to physician-investors differ-
ently than to non-investors.85
In September of 1993, the OIG proposed three new safe harbor
provisions that expand protection for joint ventures involving Medi-
care referrals.86 If the regulations are promulgated, a physician will be
protected when he refers Medicare patients to a facility in a rural area
in which he owns an interest.87 This exemption will only be granted if
eighty-five percent of the entity's business is derived from services to
rural residentsm8 and the opportunity to invest is offered "in a good
faith, nondiscriminatory manner to any individuals or entities who are
potential sources of capital. '89 This provision recognizes the fact that
physicians are frequently the only willing investors in a rural commu-
nity.90 The second proposed safe harbor would allow physicians to
refer their Medicare patients to ambulatory surgical care centers in
which they own an interest when all investors in the center are sur-
geons who perform services there.91 This provision is based on the
presumption that profit distributions from certain kinds of joint ven-
tures are not likely to affect referrals. At an ambulatory care center,
in particular, a surgeon's professional fee is so much greater than the
profit she would receive as an investor in the facility that the profit
distribution probably would not influence her volume of referrals.9'
The third proposed safe harbor would allow physicians active in a
group practice to refer Medicare patients to a facility when all inves-
82. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1)(v), (a)(2)(iii), (viii).
83. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1)(ii), (a)(2)(ii).
84. Id. § 1001.952(d)(1)(iv), (a)(2)(vii).
85. Id. § 1001.952(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(v).
86. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001); the other four safe
harbors would protect, under certain circumstances, practitioner recruitment, payment by
hospitals of obstetrical malpractice insurance, referral agreements for specialty services,
and cooperative hospital service organizations. Id.
87. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008-09 (1993).
88. Id. "Rural area" would be defined according to Office of Management and
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tors in the facility are active in a group practice that refers patients to
the entity.93 As of August 1994, the OIG is still receiving comments
and has not promulgated final regulations.
Joint ventures that accept referrals of Medicare patients from
physician-investors are clearly subject to some scrutiny under the
Anti-Fraud Statute, but there is not yet an entirely predictable legal
environment for such ventures. The OIG clearly indicated its inten-
tion to apply the Anti-Fraud Statute to physician joint ventures when
it brought the Hanlester Network suit, but it is difficult to know
whether the OIG will investigate borderline violators or limit its in-
quiries to egregious offenders. Safe harbors provide some guidance to
investors, but they are not the equivalent of statutory provisions. That
is, a joint venture with sixty-five percent of its physician-investors in a
position to refer to the facility, instead of the forty percent recom-
mended in the safe harbor provisions, will not necessarily violate the
Anti-Fraud Statute.94 The venture simply will not be protected in a
safe harbor. The most important document in this area is the Fraud
Alert, which indicates the arrangements the OIG finds most
offensive.95
B. Stark I
Congress responded more directly and clearly to physician joint
ventures in 1989 through the passage of the Ethics in Patient Referrals
93. Id. at 49,010. Recognizing that there are other kinds of joint ventures consisting
only of active investors, such as partnerships with general partner investors, the OIG has
solicited comments on whether these should be included in the new safe harbor. Id.
94. One attorney recommends a "pure heart" test to help investors and physicians
determine whether the statute has been violated. Brian McCormick, Feds Claim Victory in
Limiting 'Self-Referral', AM. MED. NEws, June 29, 1992, at 1, 39 (quoting San Francisco
attorney Gerald Peters). He suggests that physicians should ask, "Was the venture an ex-
isting service spun off solely to provide profit for physicians, or was it a new service created
to improve patient care?" Id. (quoting San Francisco attorney Gerald Peters). If the for-
mer, "you are not going to look like you have a pure heart." Id. (quoting San Francisco
attorney Gerald Peters).
95. Attorney Sanford Teplitzky, clearly drawing on the Fraud Alert, recommends that
a joint venture have the following in order to avoid violating the statute:
(1) A well-documented, legitimate business purpose for the venture. There
should be employees, customers, accounts payable, etc.
(2) Legitimate sources of ownership investment, with investor capital at risk.
(3) Neither entry into the venture nor continued participation tied to referrals.
(4) Profits and losses tied to percentage of ownership, with volume-sensitive pay-
ments avoided.
(5) Quality assurance and utilization review programs.
(6) Disclosure of ownership to patients.
McCormick, supra note 94, at 39.
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Act (Stark I).96 Stark I became effective in January of 1992 and will
be supplemented in January of 1995.97 Stark I prohibits a physician
from referring Medicare patients to a clinical laboratory in which the
physician or his immediate family member owns an interest.98 There
are three major exceptions. The "personal services" exception allows
a physician to make an otherwise prohibited referral when he or a
member of his group practice 99 personally provides or supervises the
services."°° The "rural area" exception allows a physician to self-refer
to a clinical lab located in a rural area. 01 The "large corporation"
provision allows self-referral when the lab is part of a publicly-held
corporation with assets of $100 million or more at the end of its last
fiscal year.
10 2
96. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(a) (Supp. IV 1992) [hereinafter Stark I]. The Act is known as
"Stark I" because of the bill's sponsor, Representative Pete Stark. See Thomas Crane &
John Steiner, Jr., Congress Expands Self-Referral Prohibitions, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA)
159, 159 (Feb. 3, 1994). Representative Stark, chairman of the House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Health has been called, among other epithets, a "one-man legislative
band" on the issue of self-referral. John K. Iglehart, Congress Moves to Regulate Self Re-
ferral and Physicians' Ownership of Clinical Laboratories, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682,
1683 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the fashioning of the bill, see id. at 1684-85.
97. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
99. "Group practice" is defined as a group of two or more physicians legally organized
as a partnership, professional corporation, foundation, not-for-profit corporation, faculty
practice plan, or similar association
(A) in which each physician who is a member of the group provides substantially
the full range of services which the physician routinely provides (including medi-
cal care, consultation, diagnosis, or treatment) through the joint use of shared
office space, facilities, equipment, and personnel;
(B) for which substantially all of the services of the physicians who are members
of the group are provided through the group and are billed in the name of the
group and amounts so received are treated as receipts of the group;
(C) in which the overhead expenses of and the income from the practice are
distributed in accordance with methods previously determined by members of the
group; and
(D) which meets such other standards as the Secretary may impose by regulation.
Id. § 1395nn(h)(4). This definition has provoked much controversy. The AMA wanted to
allow doctors who were not part of a formal group practice to be able to refer to facilities
in which they shared an interest. Diane M. Gianelli, Budget Package Tightens Up Self-
Referral, Am. Mar). NEws, Aug. 23, 1993, at 8.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Further, a physician or a member of his
group practice can provide in-office services ancillary to his practice. They must be pro-
vided or supervised by the referring physician or a member of his group practice. They
must also be provided in a building in which the physician or group practice member prac-
tices medicine or in a central location set up by the group to perform the services. Certain
billing requirements must be met as well. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2).
101. Id. § 1395nn(d)(2).
102. Id. § 1395nn(c). To be eligible for this exception, the physician must have
purchased the security on terms generally available to the public and the security must
have been listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange or on the American Stock
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The statute requires that each clinical lab affected by the statute
provide the government with the names of physician-investors.
10 3
Further, Medicare reimbursement claims must identify the name and
Medicare identification number of the referring physician.10 4
Penalties for illegal referrals are stiff. A clinical lab providing
services prohibited by the statute will not receive reimbursement for
those services.10 5 When a lab submits a Medicare claim for services
provided to a patient as a result of a prohibited referral, the lab could
be fined up to $15,000 per test and lose its right to participate in the
Medicare program.106 A physician or entity that enters into an ar-
rangement that has the purpose of circumventing the statute can be
fined up to $100,000.107
Stark I is a rather limited measure, because it only affects refer-
rals of Medicare patients to clinical 108 Representative Pete Stark suc-
cessfully pushed for an expansion of the statute in 1993.
C. The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of
1993
The most important piece of self-referral legislation to date is the
Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993 (Stark
11). 109 Stark II, effective January 1, 1995, provides that a physician
cannot self-refer for the following "designated health services": physi-
Exchange or must have been a national market system security traded under an automated
interdealer quotation system operated by the National Association of Securities Dealers.
Id. Other exceptions are provided for physician investment in prepaid plan organizations,
id. § 1395nn(b)(3); hospitils, if the financial relationship does not relate to the provision of
clinical laboratory services, id. § 1395nn(b)(4); hospitals in Puerto Rico, id. § 1395nn(d)(1);
and hospitals themselves, not merely subdivisions thereof, when the referring physician is
authorized to perform services at the hospital, id. § 1395nn(d)(3). The following are not
prohibited by the statute when certain conditions are met: rental of office space, employ-
ment and service arrangements with hospitals, physician recruitment, and isolated transac-
tions. Id. § 1395nn(e).
103. Id. § 1395nn(f).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 1395nn(g)(1).
106. Id. § 1395nn(g)(3).
107. Id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
108. At the time Stark I was passed, the best evidence relating to self-referral was the
1989 OIG study focusing on clinical laboratories and durable medical equipment. Since
then, more studies have shown that self-referral may be a problem in a variety of contexts.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
109. The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. VI 1994)). The Act is gener-
ally known as Stark II. See Crane & Steiner, supra note 96, at 159. For legislative history
and a description of differences between Stark I and Stark II, see H.R. CONF. REP. No.
103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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cal therapy; occupational therapy; radiology or other diagnostic serv-
ices;"' radiation therapy; durable medical equipment;"' parenteral
and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies;112 prosthetics, orthot-
ics, and prosthetic devices; home health services; outpatient prescrip-
tion drugs; and inpatient and outpatient hospital services. The
statute further provides that indirect ownership will be treated the
same as direct ownership of a facility." 4
Stark II retains the same exceptions as Stark I, with a few modifi-
cations. As in Stark I, a physician may refer for services when he or a
member of his group practice provides the services personally at the
facility."' The "rural area" exception in Stark I has been narrowed:
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5)(c) (Supp. VI 1994). However, a referral by a radiologist
for diagnostic radiology services and by a radiation oncologist for radiation therapy are
allowed if the service is performed by the referring provider pursuant to a consultation
requested by another physician. Id.
111. An exception is made for the in-office provision of durable medical goods. Id.
112. An exception is made for the in-office provision of parenteral and enteral nutri-
ents, equipment, and supplies. Id.
113. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6). This provision may or may not prohibit physicians from own-
ing an interest in an ambulatory surgical care center. The provision could be interpreted as
prohibiting physicians from referring patients to any facility that provides care that could
be characterized as "outpatient hospital services," such as an ambulatory surgical care
center. If the provision is interpreted this way, then Stark II effectively prevents physicians
from investing in almost any kind of facility; almost every facility provides services that
could be provided in a hospital. Alternatively, the provision could be interpreted to pro-
hibit a physician from referring patients to a hospital in which the physician has an interest,
whether the hospital provides the services on an inpatient basis or contracts with another
entity to provide the services on an outpatient basis.
114. An ownership interest, for the purposes of Stark II, "may be through equity, debt,
or other means and includes an interest in an entity that holds an ownership or investment
interest in any entity providing the designated health service." Id. § 1395nn(a)(2). This
provision addresses the concerns of critics that physicians and investors evaded Stark I
through complex ownership arrangements. See Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 498
("Since the Stark legislation [of 1989] and the reporting requirements do not explicitly
prohibit referrals by indirect owners, it may be possible to circumvent these laws through
complex indirect ownership arrangements."). Mitchell and Scott argue that
[i]f regulation is meant to restrict referrals to for-profit health care facilities, then
the legislation must clearly define investment interests, ownership structures, and
compensation relationships to include both direct and indirect ownership ar-
rangements. Failure to recognize indirect ownership and compensation arrange-
ments will limit the impact of any regulation that attempts to prohibit the practice
of self-referral.
Id. at 518.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (Supp. VI 1994). A new requirement is added for physi-
cians who seek to characterize themselves as members of a group practice under the stat-
ute: Members of the group must conduct personally no less than 75% of the physician-
patient encounters of the group practice. Id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(A)(V). Stark II also specifies
that a physician in group practice may not receive compensation based on the volume or
value of her referrals, but she can be paid both a share of overall profits of the group, and a
productivity bonus based on services personally performed or supervised. Id. Neither a
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Stark II requires that "substantially all" of the health services fur-
nished by the entity be provided to individuals living in a rural area.
116
The "large corporation" exception requirements have been eased.117
The AMA argued that an exemption should be provided when com-
munity need for a facility and lack of available alternative financing
could be shown, 118 but no such provision was included. The greatest
weakness of Stark II is the same as that of Stark I: it only covers
referrals of Medicare patients.119
D. The Federal Response: Conclusion
Before Stark II, most physician-investors were affected only by
the Anti-Fraud Statute. A doctor who learned of an opportunity to
invest in an MRI center near her practice,120 for instance, would not
have needed to consider Stark I, since it only applies to investments in
clinical labs. If she heeded the Fraud Alert, she would have made a
reasonable capital investment in the enterprise. The safest investment
would have been one in which no more than forty percent of her co-
investors were physicians and the physicians provided no more than
forty percent of referrals to the facility, because safe-harbor provi-
profit distribution nor a productivity bonus can be related to the volume or value of refer-
rals by a physician. Id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(B)(i).
Attorneys Thomas Crane and John Steiner, Jr. assert that "Congress... toughened
the requirements to qualify in an effort to restrict group practices without walls," but they
note that Congress's failure to limit the numbers of physicians allowed to participate in a
"group practice" encourages small physician groups to form combinations. Crane &
Steiner, supra note 96, at 160.
116. Id. § 1395nn(d)(2). The statute also allows a new type of investment: ownership
of shares in a regulated investment company as defined in § 851(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, if such company has assets of $75 million. Id. § 1395nn(c)(2).
117. Id. § 1395nn(c). "Large corporation" is defined as a corporation having assets of
$75 million at the end of its last fiscal year, or on average during the previous three fiscal
years, rather than $100 million at the end of its last fiscal year. Id.
118. 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 205 (statement of Dr. Nancy W. Dickey, Member,
Board of Trustees, American Medical Association). See generally Diane M. Gianelli,
Budget Package Tightens Up Self-Referral, AM. MED. NEws, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1 (describing
response of AMA to new legislation).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a). Some argue that Stark II significantly strengthens the fed-
eral response to self-referral because of the way in which it acts as a supplement to the
Anti-Fraud Statute:
[Stark II] will likely have the effect of decriminalizing conduct covered by both
pieces of legislation because unless clear criminal intent is present it is likely that
the first line enforcement authority will be Stark II, which provides for only civil
sanctions. Thus, Stark II should have the effect of leaving criminal prosecutors
more free time to prosecute clear criminal conduct and financial inducements not
covered under Stark II.
Crane & Steiner, supra note 96, at 160.
120. A 1990 AMA survey showed that physicians were most likely to invest in MRI,
radiology, or clinical laboratory facilities. Mitchell & Scott, supra note 1, at 506.
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sions protect that structure. The Anti-Fraud statute would not have
posed insurmountable hurdles to self-referrals.
After Stark II goes into effect in January of 1995, a doctor who
made such an investment will likely have to divest herself of it. Stark
II unequivocally prohibits self-referral of Medicare patients to MRI
centers in most instances. Only if the doctor's investment falls within
a statutory exception will she be able to retain the investment. Many
physicians will find themselves in a similar position-required to
divest-in early 1995. For those doctors who invested in facilities in
rural areas or those in which they provide services personally (both of
which may be retained), the Fraud Alert will continue to be the most
important guideline.
Stark II will unquestionably have a significant effect on existing
joint ventures and will deter the formation of others, but its great limi-
tation is that it only affects referrals of Medicare patients. Since forty
percent of the nation's health care bills are paid by public programs,
many physicians do treat Medicare patients.' 21 Still, the majority of
bills are not covered by Medicare-and state law alone deals with self-
referral in this context.
IV. Trm STATE RESPONSES
By September of 1994, thirty-two states had enacted self-referral
legislation. Statutes in eighteen states restrict the practice,' while
statutes in fourteen require physicians only to disclose investment in-
terests to patients.'" Briefly described, the fourteen "disclosure" stat-
121. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: VULNERABLE PAY-
ERS LOSE BILLIONS TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 21 (1992).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 455.241 (West 1981), 455.236-.237 (West Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 43-1B-3 to -24 (Michie Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, P 47/15-25
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2081-2087 (West Supp. 1993);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 1-301 to -306 (West Supp. 1993); MiCH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.15(16221) (Callaghan 1988); Mo. AN. STAT. § 334.252-.253 (Vernon Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-101 to -102 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 439B.420-.425,
630.305, 652.235 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.4 to .5 (West 1991); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 238-a to -e (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-405 to -408
(1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.65-.68 (Anderson Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-
48.1-1 to -5 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-113-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-601 to -608 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2410 to -2414
(Michie Supp. 1994).
In addition, at least 36 states prohibit physicians from receiving or paying kickbacks
for referrals. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES: FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN REFERRING PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: STATE LAWS AND
REGULATIONS 6 (1989).
123. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(24)(ff) (Supp. 1993); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 650, 654.1-.2 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-7a to -7b (West Supp. 1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837(29) (Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1744 (West Supp.
1994]
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utes do not require physicians to divest their interest in a facility to
which they refer patients, but only to reveal the interest to those pa-
tients. 124 Most of the other state legislation can be characterized as
taking a "community need" or "federal model" approach, though
some statutes combine elements in unique ways. The seven commu-
nity-need statutes impose significant limits on a physician's discretion,
generally allowing self-referral only when there is a demonstrated
community need for the service and no alternative financing avail-
able."2 More restrictive are the six federal-model statutes, which
mainly allow self-referral to facilities when the referring physician per-
sonally provides services there or when the facility is located in a rural
area. 26 Anomaly statutes are broader and narrower in unique ways.
The remainder of this Comment distinguishes the various patterns of
legislation, explains how each type supplements federal law, and ex-
amines the strengths and weaknesses of the statutes.
A. Disclosure States
States allowing self-referral when it is accompanied by disclosure
are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Utah, 'Washington, and West Virginia. 27 Typically, these
states do not have extensive or detailed legislation on the subject.
Failure to disclose often results in the sanctions associated with other
violations of the state's code of professional conduct. 28
West Virginia's statute, perhaps the most ambiguous of the dis-
closure laws, provides that it is unprofessional conduct for a physician
to refer a patient to any clinical laboratory or pharmacy in which she
1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12AA (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
§ 147.091(p)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:25-a to -c (Supp. 1993);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 725.4 (Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.21-.22 (1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-2-19 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-44 (Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.130.180 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(c)(7) (1993).
124. See statutes cited supra note 123. For further discussion, see infra notes 127-51 and
accompanying text.
125. Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia have
community-need statutes. See statutes cited supra note 122. For further discussion, see
infra notes 152-74 and accompanying text.
126. Florida, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South Carolina have federal
model statutes. See statutes cited supra note 122. For further discussion, see infra notes
175-86 and accompanying text.
127. See statutes cited supra note 123.
128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 99 147.091, 147.141 (Supp. 1994). Oklahoma provides that
violations of the disclosure requirements are punishable by disciplinary action by the rele-
vant state agency and by a fine of between $100 and $1000. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5p,
§ 725.4(B) (West Supp. 1993).
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has a proprietary interest unless she discloses the interest in writing.12 9
The writing must indicate that the patient may have any clinical labo-
ratory perform the requisite tests or any pharmacy provide the drugs
prescribed. 30 This statute provokes many questions. Must a physi-
cian disclose an indirect financial interest, such as her ownership inter-
est in a corporation that is a partner in a facility to which she refers?
13'
Should she reveal an investment interest held by her spouse or an-
other member of her immediate family? Must the disclosure form re-
veal the amount or nature of the interest? Should the form identify
specific alternative entities where the patient may also receive the
drug or service? Must the written disclosure be provided to the pa-
tient directly, or may it be posted on a wall? If provided to the patient
directly, must it be given in advance of the patient's receipt of the
treatment? In West Virginia, physicians must provide their own an-
swers until these questions are answered by the courts.
Other states' statutes are somewhat more detailed. Kansas, for
instance, only requires disclosure of an interest in a facility when the
interest is greater than ten percent. 132 Louisiana does not require dis-
closure when referral is made within a group practice,133 and Minne-
sota does not when the referring physician performs services at the
facility. 34 Other states have more specific requirements for the dis-
closure forms themselves. Arizonad, for instance, requires that pa-
tients sign the disclosure form.
3 5
129. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(c)(7) (1993). The statute applies to podiatrists as well as
physicians. Id.
130. Id.
131. West Virginia only specifically excludes lease arrangements from the purview of
the statute. Id. § 30-3-14(c)(7).
132. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2837(29)(h) (Supp. 1993). California requires disclosure
when a provider or member of his immediate family owns an investment interest greater
than five percent of the entity or $5,000, whichever is lower, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 654.2(d) (West 1990), and South Dakota requires disclosure when the investment interest
is greater than twenty-five percent, S.D. CODFMED LAWS ANN. § 36-2-19 (Supp. 1994).
133. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1744(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1994).
134. MINN. STAT. § 147.091(p)(4) (1992). Oklahoma has a similar provision, exempting
disclosure when the testing center or laboratory is an extension of or ancillary to the pro-
vider's practice and the health provider "provides for and supervises the services at the
facility." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 725A(A) (Supp. 1994).
135. See Agiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1401(24)(ff) (Supp. 1993). The statute requires
that a patient or his guardian sign a form by which he acknowledges his understanding that
"the doctor has a direct financial interest" in the goods or services prescribed and, if such is
the case, that "the precribed treatment, goods or services are available on a competitive
basis." Id. Massachusetts's statute provides that a physician who refers a patient for physi-
cal therapy services to an entity in which the physician owns an interest must disclose that
interest in the following language: "The referring registered or licensed person maintains
an ownership interest in the facility to which you are being referred for physical therapy
3151994]
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New Hampshire's statute is the most comprehensive of the disclo-
sure statutes. 36 It applies to referrals made by any health care pro-
vider for diagnostic services, physical therapy, radiation therapy,
intravenous therapy, rehabilitation services, or services provided in a
hospital when the service is not exclusively owned by the hospital. 137
In-office diagnostic tests are not within the scope of the statute.1 38 In-
vestment interests of a provider or his spouse or child trigger the stat-
ute, but not when the ownership interest is comprised of publicly-
traded securities purchased on terms available to the general public. 139
New Hampshire's law details the disclosure process itself. A writ-
ten disclosure form must be given to each patient at the time of refer-
ral or, if referred by phone, verbal disclosure must be followed by a
prompt written statement."' The form must "conspicuously" contain
the following language:
The referring health care practitioner maintains an owner-
ship interest in the facility to which you are being referred.
You are not required to utilize the facility to which you are
being referred for these services. These services may be
available elsewhere in the community. This office will pro-
vide an alternative referral upon your request. 4 '
Failure to provide a disclosure form can result in suspension of a pro-
fessional's license. 42
New Hampshire has also set up a mechanism for monitoring phy-
sician self-referral. The statute requires practitioners who self-refer to
report on a quarterly basis their financial interest in the facility and
the total number of their referrals to that facility.' 43 The division of
public health services will transmit the information to the state legisla-
ture by April 1, 1995, and will make a recommendation regarding the
need for further self-referral legislation. 44
service. Physical therapy services may be available elsewhere in the community." MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12AA (West Supp. 1994).
136. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:25-a to -c (Supp. 1993). Massachusetts's law, in con-
trast, is the most limited. It covers only referrals to physical therapy centers. See supra
note 135.
137. Id. §§ 125:25-a(I), -a(V), -b(I), -b(IV), -b(V). Rehabilitation services include phys-
ical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech pathology. Id. § 125:25-a(IV).
138. Id. § 125:25-b(IV), (V).
139. Investment interests are defined as "including, but not limited to, any membership,
proprietary interest, stock interest, partnership interest, co-ownership in any form, or any
profit-sharing arrangement." Id. § 125:25-a(IV).
140. Id. § 125:25-b(H).
141. Id. § 125:25-b(III).
142. Id. § 125:25-b(VI).
143. Id. § 125:25-c.
144. Act of June 29, 1993, ch. 334, 1993 N.H. Laws 334:3.
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State disclosure laws affect physicians in two ways. First, the stat-
utes supplement federal law when federal law permits self-referral.
Stark II will allow a physician to self-refer to an occupational therapy
center in a rural area, for example, but New Hampshire law further
requires the physician to disclose his interest to patients he refers.14
Disclosure statutes also affect referrals of private patients not covered
by federal law. Though a physician who refers only private patients to
a lab in which he has invested is not affected by Stark II, New Hamp-
shire's statute requires him to disclose that interest to such patients.
The wisdom of disclosure statutes is questionable. 146 The impetus
behind self-referral legislation has been the need to reduce unneces-
sary utilization of tests and services and thus lower health care costs
generally. 47 By simply requiring a physician to disclose his interest to
a patient, however, it is not clear that any wasteful practices will be
stopped. Most statutes do not require specific language, creating the
possibility that the disclosure form is actually being used as an adver-
tisement. The Deputy Inspector General testified in 1993 that "such a
'disclosure' by the physician is often turned into a positive testimonial
about the entity where the patient is being sent."'1 4 8 Also, most states
do not monitor how and when disclosure takes place. Studies in a
related area, informed consent, have shown that full disclosure "still
occurs relatively infrequently and not as envisioned by the law."' 49
Even if a physician's financial interest is adequately and disinter-
estedly disclosed, patients may not have the incentive to seek a differ-
ent facility or to question the necessity of the recommended test or
service. Most patients trust their doctors and would not be inclined to
question their physician's recommendation.' 50 Further, many health
insurance plans and Medicare and Medicaid do not give patients a
145. For a discussion of Stark II, see supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
146. The OIG Report describes disclosure laws as "perhaps the least onerous" of re-
strictions on self-referral, but also "the least likely to influence actual patterns of use of
services." OIG Report, supra note 2, at 19,937. For a contrary viewpoint, see Carol
Michna, Note, The Patient Has Not Been Informed: A Proposal for a Physician Conflict of
Interest Disclosure Law, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 495, 523-528 (1993).
147. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
148. See 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 170 (statement of Larry Morey, Deputy Inspec-
tor General for Investigations, Office of Inspector General).
149. Marc Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (1989).
150. As Rodwin states,
patients are particularly vulnerable. Frequently, they are involuntary consumers
who cannot plan their purchases and assess alternatives carefully. They often
have little opportunity to learn from personal experience, or the cost of doing so
may be high. These constraints distort their choices as consumers and increase
their reliance on the recommendations of their physicians.
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strong incentive to seek health care bargains. Even though some pa-
tients do have such an incentive in the form of a lower co-payment, it
is often difficult for patients to evaluate their options in the health
care market. In a 1989 survey, over fifty percent of those interviewed
reported that they found it "somewhat or very hard to shop for doc-
tors and hospitals," and nearly three-fourths found it similarly difficult
to shop for ancillary services. 151 In our present health care system,
disclosure of a physician's investment will probably not significantly
affect the choices patients make, and it is thus unlikely that disclosure
will help limit overutilization of tests and services. In our present
health care system, disclosure may do little more than increase aware-
ness of physician investment.
B. Community-Need Statutes
Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia have passed legislation that regulates self-referral far
more effectively than disclosure alone.' 52 Statutes in these states gen-
erally prohibit physician self-referral, but the exceptions they provide
are notable. Like Stark II, the statutes allow self-referral when the
referring physician personally provides services at the facility or when
the facility is part of a large corporation in which a physician has an
interest." 3 Unlike Stark II, however, the statutes also allow self-refer-
ral when community need for the services and a lack of alternative
financing can be shown, so long as referral to such a facility is accom-
panied by disclosure.
Statutes in North Carolina and Virginia illustrate some of the
common characteristics, as well as some of the variations, in the com-
munity-need legislation. 54 Both states' laws prohibit any health care
practitioner' 55 from referring patients to an entity in which he or an
Id. at 1406. Rodwin suggests that disclosure statements might be more effective if they
required "physicians who recommend expensive tests or procedures in facilities in which
they have a financial interest... [to] advise their patients to seek a second opinion from a
physician without a conflict of interest." Id.
151. Id. The OIG Report noted that "[p]atients have little basis with which to judge the
efficiency, quality, or even pricing of one facility versus another." OIG Report, supra note
2, at 19,937.
152. See statutes cited supra note 122.
153. For discussion of Stark II exceptions, see supra notes 109-21 and accompanying
text.
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-405 to -408 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2410-2414
(Michie Supp. 1994).
155. Virginia's statute, like those of most of the other community-need states, encom-
passes referrals made by most health care professionals licensed by the state-Virginia
excludes only embalmers and veterinarians. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2410 (Michie Supp.
1994). In North Carolina, the statute specifically applies to those licensed or certified to
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immediate family member has an investment interest,156 but the stat-
utes define "immediate family" very differently. In Virginia, "imme-
diate family" encompasses a physician's spouse, child, child's spouse,
stepchild, stepchild's spouse, grandchild, grandchild's spouse, parent,
stepparent, parent-in-law, or sibling, while in North Carolina it in-
cludes only his spouse or dependent minor child.'57 Both statutes
make exceptions for investments in large corporations,'158 but only
Virginia makes the typical exception for facilities where the physician
personally provides care. 59 Most importantly, both permit invest-
ment and referral if there is a "demonstrated need" in the community
for the facility and alternative financing is not available. 60 North Car-
olina's requirements are probably easier to satisfy, since the statute
does not define "demonstrated need" and only requires that alterna-
tive financing not be available "on reasonable terms from other
sources."' 6 ' Virginia, in contrast, finds demonstrated need only when
there is no facility in the community providing similar services and
alternative financing is not available for the facility. 62
practice medicine, dentistry, optometry, osteopathy, chiropractic, nursing, podiatry, psy-
chology, physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech and language pathology, and audi-
ology. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-406(7) (1993). Tennessee's statute is unusual in this regard,
as its statute regulates only physicians. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-602 (Supp. 1993).
156. North Carolina also prohibits referral to a facility in which a member of a physi-
cian's group practice has an investment interest in the facility. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
406(2) (1993).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-405(8)
(1993). Definitions of "immediate family" vary significantly in community-need statutes.
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 1-301 (Supp. 1993) (defining "immediate family" as
spouse, child, child's spouse, parent, spouse's parent, sibling, and sibling's spouse); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 225, P 47/15(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (defining "immediate family" as
spouse, child, child's spouse, and a parent).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-405(9)(d) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2411(D) (Michie
Supp. 1994).
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2411(A). North Carolina's is the only community-need
statute that does not allow physicians to self-refer to facilities where they personally pro-
vide services. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-405(9)(9).
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-408(a)(1) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2411(B) (Michie
Supp. 1994). The criteria for both statutes are the following: individuals other than practi-
tioners must be offered an opportunity to invest in the entity on the same terms as those
offered to referring practitioners; no investor-practitioner can be required or encouraged
to refer patients to the entity or otherwise generate business as a condition of becoming or
remaining an investor, the services of the entity must be marketed to practitioner-investors
and other investors on the same terms; the entity cannot issue or guarantee loans for prac-
titioners who are in a position to refer patients to the entity; the income on the practition-
ers' investment must be based on his equity in the entity, not his referral volumes; and the
investment contract between the entity and the practitioner cannot include any covenant
or clause limiting or preventing the practitioner's investment in other entities. Id.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-408(a)(2) (1993).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2410 (Michie Supp. 1994). The AMA's Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs recommended that demonstrated need for a facility could be shown
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When the community-need exemption is granted in either state, a
physician must disclose his interest in the facility to the patient. In
both states, disclosure must be made at the time of referral, include a
list of reasonably available alternative facilities, if any, and assure the
patient that choosing another entity will not affect his treatment or
care.163 In Virginia, the entity must establish an internal-use review to
ensure that investors are making appropriate referrals.164 Penalties
for prohibited self-referral are harsh in both states: referrals in con-
travention of the statute may subject a provider to $20,000 in civil pen-
alties for each referral and may be punished with disciplinary action
by the appropriate regulatory board. 65 In North Carolina, an ar-
rangement designed to circumvent the statute can be penalized by a
$75,000 fine, and an entity that performs services pursuant to a pro-
hibited referral may not make a claim for payment for those
services. 66
Statutes in Georgia, Maryland, Maine, Illinois, and Tennessee are
generally similar to the North Carolina and Virginia legislation but
vary in a few important ways. Illinois and Maine provide a more gen-
erous definition of the circumstances under which a state agency can
find that a community need exists. 67 Georgia requires a community-
"when there is no facility of reasonable quality in the community or when use of existing
facilities is onerous for patients." 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 211. Maine and Illinois
follow these recommendations more closely. See infra note 167.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-408(c) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2411(C) (Michie Supp.
1994). North Carolina and Virginia thus do not require disclosure when a physician is
allowed to self-refer under another statutory exception, such as the large corporation ex-
ception. In contrast, Illinois and Maine explicitly require all practitioners who are allowed
to self-refer to disclose their interest to patients. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 225, 47/20(b)(7)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2085(2)(D)(7) (West Supp. 1993).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2411(C)(3) (Michie Supp. 1994).
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-407 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54,1-2412(C)-(D) (Michie
Supp. 1994).
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-407(c), 90-406(b) (1993).
167. In Illinois, demonstrated need exists when:
(1) there is no facility of reasonable quality that provides appropriate service,
(2) use of existing facilities is onerous or creates too great a hardship for patients,
(3) the entity is formed to own or lease medical equipment which replaces obso-
lete or otherwise inadequate equipment in or under the control of a hospital lo-
cated in a federally designated health manpower shortage area, or
(4) such other standards as established, by rule, by the [Health Care Facilities
Planning] Board.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, P 42/20(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994). In Maine, the language is
identical except in the last section, which requires that a facility meet other standards es-
tablished by the Bureau of Insurance, "including a standard allowing the Bureau to deter-
mine whether the fees charged for the health services are competitive with fees charged for




need facility to provide uncompensated health services for indigent or
charity patients at a rate at or above three percent of the gross reve-
nues of the facility."6 Tennessee's statute contains a grandfather
clause allowing physicians who made investments before passage of
the statute to retain their investments:
If physicians have invested in entities prior to the effective
date of this act, the physicians shall reevaluate their activity
in accordance with the provisions of this act and comply with
its provisions. If compliance with the need and alternative
investor criteria is not practical, it is essential that the identi-
fication of reasonably available alternative entities be
provided.169
Illinois and Maine have similar provisions, but they both require that
a state agency designate, by rule, when compliance is "not
practical."'170
The greatest strength of community-need legislation is its flexibil-
ity. The community-need provision takes the place of the Stark II ex-
emption that allows physicians in rural areas to self-refer when the
facility provides most of its services to rural residents. The purpose of
the Stark II rural area exemption and the community-need exemep-
tion is the same: to allow physicians to invest where a facility is
needed but capital is lacking. Federal law is willing to presume that
these conditions are generally present in rural areas, while the state
statutes allow physicians to show that it might be true in urban areas
as well. Community-need legislation more fully acknowledges that
physicians in any area may be motivated by a desire to meet their
patients' needs and may be willing to provide capital for facilities
when outside investors are not.' 71 It recognizes that a societal inter-
est-the provision of medical services to those in underserved com-
munities-sometimes outweighs the hazards associated with self-
referral.72
Illinois and Maine also allow providers to request advisory opinions as to the legality
of a particular referral. ILL. Corm. STAT. ANN. ch. 225, § 47/20(g) (Michie Supp. 1994);
ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2085(7) (West Supp. 1993).
168. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1B-6(a)(4) (Supp. 1993). Georgia also provides that invest-
ment interests in facilities in rural areas are not covered by its statute. Id. § 43-1B-3(8)(A).
169. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-605 (Supp. 1993).
170. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 225, para. 47/20(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2085(6) (West Supp. 1993).
171. See 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 206-17 (Report of the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs and Self-Referral Clarifications).
172. As the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Associa-
tion argued,
patients may be deprived of the best health care if physicians cannot invest and
self-refer. Physicians have often been exclusively motivated by the important
19941
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At the same time, community need legislation does not allow self-
referral when the need for a facility is questionable or other investors
are available. In some instances raises higher hurdles to investment
than Stark II does. Stark II requires a physician in a rural area who
wants to invest in an occupational therapy center, for instance, to
show that substantially all of the therapy services will be provided to
people living in a rural area. 73 Community-need legislation requires
an additional showing of demonstrated need and a lack of alternative
financing. Community-need legislation also requires more than fed-
eral law in relatively affluent urban areas where physicians are likely
needs of their patients in becoming involved in such arrangements. Blanket bans
on self-referral are inappropriate. Investing and referring when it is a direct ex-
tension of a physician's commitment to serve patients' needs is both ethical and
desirable.
1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 210 (Report by the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs).
The Council has further noted that physicians may be willing to accept a lower rate of
return on an investment in a rural or poor area, since they will be concerned not only with
profits, the main-concern of a non-physician-investor, but also with providing needed care
for their patients. Council Report, supra note 6, at 2368.
On the other hand, arguments can be made that a genuine community need for a
facility would attract outside investors, and that allowing this much flexibility in legislation
leaves too much room for the unscrupulous to abuse the provision. As Rep. Pete Stark put
it, "every time we start making exemptions from [a general ban on self-referral], six law
firms and three accountants dream up new ways to get around it, and the fact is that it is
very profitable .... ." 1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 189.
In an attempt to address such concerns, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has
recently clarified its recommendations for community-need legislation. The Council rec-
ommends that self-referral be allowed only when there is no facility of reasonable quality
in the area, the use of existing facilities is onerous to patients, and there is a lack of alterna-
tive financing, defining those terms as follows:
No facility of reasonable quality. Self-referral cannot be justified simply if the
facility would offer some marginal improvement over the quality of services in the
community. The potential benefits of the facility should be substantial to justify
assuming the risks of self-referral. The question is whether the community has
facilities that can provide medically appropriate services....
Use of existing facilities is onerous .... This might occur, for example, if existing
facilities are so heavily used that patients face undue delays in receiving services.
A delay is undue if putting off the service could compromise the patient's care,
i.e., it would affect the curability or reversibility of the patient's condition. There
would also be a hardship if patients had long travel times that made it difficult for
them to receive services.... Longer travel times would be acceptable if patients
tended to use the facility rarely, while longer travel times would be unacceptable
if patients tended to use the facility more regularly.
Alternative financing .... The burden on the builder of the facility is to show that
adequate capital could not be raised without turning to self-referring physicians.
As to the kind of efforts that must be made to secure alternative financing, the
builder would have to undertake the usual steps that entrepreneurs undertake,
including efforts to secure funding from banks, other financial institutions, and
venture capitalists.
1993 Hearings, supra note 7, at 216.
173. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73322
PHYSICIAN JOINT VENTURES
to have many privately insured patients. 74 A physician who treats
many non-Medicare patients may decide that an investment in an
MRI center, for instance, would be profitable since she could guaran-
tee a flow of privately-insured patients to the facility. Stark II would
only prevent the physician from referring Medicare patients to the
center. Community-need legislation, however, prohibits self-referral
unless she can show that the local population needs the center and
there is no other means to finance it. In affluent urban areas and rural
areas, community-need legislation probably supplements federal law
effectively, serving as an additional barrier to joint ventures of ques-
tionable necessity.
Community need legislation cannot serve as an equally beneficial
supplement in poor urban areas, but that shortcoming is due to Stark
II. Community-need legislation would give physicians in poorer ur-
ban areas the opportunity to show that a particular facility was needed
and yet did not interest an adequate number of non-physician-inves-
tors. Stark II, however, absolutely bars physicians from investing in
such a center unless the physician performs services there personally
or his investment meets the requirements of one of the other statutory
exceptions. Despite this limitation, community need legislation gener-
ally fills the gaps in federal law in a cautious but not rigid manner.
C. Federal Model Statutes
"Federal model" statutes are fairly strict, allowing self-referral
only in a few clearly defined situations. Florida, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and South Carolina can be categorized as federal
model states because their legislation in various ways extends federal
law restrictions on referrals of Medicare patients to referrals of all
patients. This type of legislation either parallels Stark 117' or incorpo-
rates important elements of the Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Statute.76
174. There is some evidence suggesting that physicians with more privately insured pa-
tients are most likely to self-refer. In one Florida study, researchers found that joint ven-
tures treated "relatively more patients with good insurance coverage." Mitchell & Scott,
supra note 53, at 2058. Joint venture comprehensive rehabilitation centers received 44% of
their pa3Fments from Blue Cross and commercial insurers and only 20.5% from Medicare,
while non-joint venture centers received only 24.8% of their payments from Blue Cross
and commercial insurers and 40% from Medicare. Id.
175. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing Stark I).
176. See supra notes 54-95 and accompanying text (discussing Anti-Fraud Statute); see
also statutes cited supra note 122.
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1. Stark I Model
New York and Ohio have enacted statutes that resemble the first
federal self-referral legislation, Stark I." 7 Stark I prohibits referral of
Medicare patients to clinical laboratories in which the referring physi-
cian has an interest. Both New York and Ohio have extended that
prohibition to referrals of all patients to clinical laboratories in which
the referring physician owns an interest, but New York has also broad-
ened it to cover referrals for pharmacy services and x-ray or imaging
services. Like Stark I, New York and Ohio allow self-referral when
the physician personally provides services at the facility, when his in-
vestment is in a larger corporation of which the facility is but a part, or
where the facility is located in a rural area.178 New York also requires
disclosure of the interest when self-referral is allowed.379
While Stark I is in effect, the New York and Ohio statutes serve
as fairly straightforward extensions of federal law: Stark I generally
prevents a physician in New York or Ohio from self-referring Medi-
care patients, and New York and Ohio law prevent the same physician
from referring his privately-insured patients to the lab. Once Stark II
takes effect, however, New York and Ohio law will serve as a far more
limited, and arguably less sensible, supplement to federal law. While
Stark II will affect Medicare referrals to many kinds of facilities, Ohio
law will prohibit other referrals only to clinical laboratories. In New
York, the combination of Stark II and current state law will produce
very different disclosure requirements for physician-investors depend-
ing on the type of facility in which they invest. For instance, a physi-
cian who is allowed under Stark II to self-refer to a clinical lab in a
rural area must disclose that interest under New York law, but a phy-
sician who is allowed under Stark II to self-refer to a physical therapy
center in a rural area does not need to disclose that interest. In Ohio,
consistency with federal law has been lost. In New York, Stark II will
wreak havoc on its initially rational extension of federal law.
177. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 238 (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.65 to .71 (Anderson 1994). See supra notes 96-108 (discussing Stark I).
178. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
179. N.Y. PUBLIC 1-EALTH LAW § 238-a(4)(D) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Ohio law pro-
vides a unique disclosure requirement: referrals for in-office ancillary services will only be
considered an exception under the statute "if the third-party payer is aware of and has
agreed in writing to reimburse the services notwithstanding the financial arrangement be-
tween the physician and the provider of such ancillary services." OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.67(D) (Anderson 1994).
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2. Safe Harbor Models
Florida and South Carolina's statutes have never been generally
consistent with federal law.' Each broadly prohibits self-referral,
but also creates a patchwork of exceptions.' 8 ' The most important
exception, allowing self-referral when less than fifty percent of inves-
tors are in a position to make referrals to an entity, is similar to a safe
harbor as defined by the Office of the Inspector General.
s'8
The states' fifty percent provision is different from the OIG safe
harbor, however, in a crucial way: the OIG mandates that no more
than forty percent of an entity's revenues come from referrals of phy-
sician-investors, while there is no such requirement in Florida or
South Carolina.' 3 Because Florida and South Carolina do not limit
the number of referrals from physician-investors, there is a danger
that those physicians could have been pressured by outside investors
into making excessive referrals. The fifty percent provision is a blunt
instrument for limiting self-referral, the primary virtue of which is
clarity.
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.25 (West 1991); id. § 455.236 (West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-113-10 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
181. Both Florida and South Carolina allow self-referral when the provider's invest-
ment interest is in a large corporation, when the provider will perform services directly at
the facility in which he owns an interest, or when the facility is located in a rural area. Like
New York, both Florida and South Carolina require a provider to disclose his investment
interest upon referral. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.25 (West 1991); id. § 455.236 (West Supp.
1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-113-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
Florida's extensive list of additional exceptions makes its legislation unique. The stat-
ute does not cover, for instance, referrals made by a radiologist for diagnostic imaging
services or by a physician specializing in the provision of radiation therapy services for such
services. These specific exceptions replace the more typical provision allowing physicians
to refer for services provided in their office. Other exceptions include referrals made by a
cardiologist for cardiac catheterization services, a urologist for lithotripsy services, and a
health care provider for diagnostic clinical laboratory services where such services are di-
rectly related to renal dialysis. The reasoning behind these exceptions may be that there
are well-established norms for the provision of certain tests and services, so a physician's
ownership in a facility therefore will have a negligible effect on the number of referrals he
makes for the services.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.236(4)(b)(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
113-30(A)(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Certain investment criteria must be met: in-
vestment opportunities must be offered on equal terms to physicians and others; a physi-
cian who is expected to make a large number of referrals may not be offered a better
investment opportunity; and a physician cannot be pressured to make referrals in order to
become or remain an investor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.236(4)(b)(2)(a); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-113-30(A)(3)(a).
As noted previously, the OIG "small entity" safe harbor protects investments from
Medicare Anti-Fraud scrutiny when no more than 40% of an entity is owned by persons in
a position to make referrals and no more than 40% of its revenues come from investor
referrals. See supra text accompanying note 81.
183. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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3. Anti-Fraud Statute Model
Rhode Island's legislation can also be characterized as a federal
model state, but one that creates a particularly ambiguous legal envi-
ronment for physicians. Without prohibiting any specific kinds of self-
referral, Rhode Island has explicitly applied the standards of the
Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute to the delivery of all health
care services and items in the state.184 The Medicare Anti-Fraud Stat-
ute prohibits remuneration for referrals in any form, and the OIG has
used the statute to monitor physician self-referral in recent years, as is
shown by the Fraud Alert, the promulgation of safe harbors, and the
Hanlester Network suit." 5 The Rhode Island statute's statement of
purpose suggests that the legislature intended the statute to be inter-
preted similarly, but the statute nonetheless leaves much to the imagi-
nation.'8 6 The Medicare Anti-Fraud statute was not designed to deal
with physician self-referral, and has only recently been used for that
purpose.
D. Anomaly States
The narrow statutes in some states are far from ambiguous. Mis-
souri penalizes self-referral for the provision of physical therapy serv-
ices.187 Montana does not allow medical practitioners to own an
184. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-48.1-1 to -5 (Supp. 1993). For an explanation of the Medicare
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Statute, see supra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
186. Rhode Island's statute reads:
(1) Individuals and corporations sometimes establish joint ventures and other
business arrangements to offer various diagnostic and therapeutic health care
services and items to patients. While some of these arrangements assist in provid-
ing appropriate, but otherwise unavailable, services and items to patients or help
finance nearby facilities as a convenience to patients, others appear to constitute
opportunities for investment. Such arrangements can give rise to abuse by creat-
ing an environment in which health care providers could order unnecessary serv-
ices from those facilities in which they own an interest. To limit such conduct,
Congress of the United States amended the Social Security Act to prohibit certain
financial arrangements....
(2) The provisions of [these] amendments ... apply only to Medicare/Medicaid
reimbursed services and a void exists with respect to services rendered at the state
level which are reimbursed by private payers.
(3) Accordingly, in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of all residents
of this state, it is deemed appropriate to adopt the standards set forth in the fed-
eral statute as applicable to the delivery of all health care services and items in
this state.
R.I. GEN. LAws § 548.1-1 (Supp. 1993).
187. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.253 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Exemptions are made: when the
facility in which the physician owns an interest is the sole provider of the service within a
rural area; when the physician owns registered securities in a large publicly held corpora-
tion; and in several other circumstances. Id. § 334.253(2).
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interest in a drug company unless the interest is acquired through
means available to the general public.' 8 Massachusetts requires dis-
closure of an interest in a physical therapy center.'8 9 These statutes
serve as a minimal supplement to federal law.
A number of other states, in contrast, have enacted sweeping pro-
visions prohibiting self-referral. Michigan enacted a law in 1977 that
made it illegal to direct or require a person to "purchase or secure a
drug, device, treatment, procedure, or service from another person,
place, facility, or business in which the licensee has a financial inter-
est."'190 This statute, enacted before much attention was given to the
problem of self-referral, could be interpreted to prohibit every in-
stance of self-referral. Apparently, it has not been used to do so.191
Nevada's legislation is also quite comprehensive. It generally prohib-
its self-referral, 92 the only significant exception being for circum-
stances in which the service or goods required by the patient are not
otherwise available within a thirty-mile radius of the office of the
practitioner.193
New Jersey's statute is an odd combination of the strongest and
the weakest elements of self-referral statutes. 94 It has one of the
broadest prohibitions on the books, stating that "[a] practitioner shall
not refer a patient or direct an employee of the practitioner to refer a
patient to a health care service in which the practitioner, or the practi-
tioner's immediate family, has a significant beneficial interest."'195 The
New Jersey statute provides only two exceptions: for personal serv-
ices provided at the practitioner's office and for radiation therapy pur-
suant to an oncological protocol, lithotripsy, and renal dialysis.
However, the statute also exempts all financial interests acquired
before July 31, 1991.196 Practitioners who acquired their interest
before that date need only disclose their interest to patients, not divest
themselves of it.' 97 New Jersey's statute is ironically very generous in
its treatment of the investment interests that caused the concern about
188. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-102 (1993).
189. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12AA (West Supp. 1994).
190. Mic. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(16221)(d)(iv) (Callaghan 1988).
191. Iglehart, supra note 1, at 200.
192. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439B.425 (Michie Supp. 1993).
193. Id. § 439B.425(1)(a).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.4 to -22.5 (West 1991).
195. Id. § 45:9-22.5(a).
196. Id. § 45:9-22.5. For further discussion of New Jersey's statute, see Brian McCor-
mick, AMA, State Society on Opposite Sides, AM. MED. NEws, June 1, 1992, at 1.
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.5 to 22.6 (West Supp. 1993). The disclosure form must
contain the following language:
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physician self-referral in the first place. Only federal legislation will
limit referrals to those facilities.
V. CONCLUSION
Physician investment can certainly benefit communities in which
an insufficient number of outside investors can be found for needed
facilities. Where there is little need for a facility, however, the dan-
gers associated with self-referral are serious. Studies of physician joint
ventures do not conclusively prove that physicians who own an inter-
est in health care facilities overutilize the services provided there, but
they do reveal a striking correlation between ownership and referral
patterns. The evidence is sufficient to warrant restrictions on self-re-
ferral, particularly when the structure of a joint venture reveals a clear
design to ensure a stream of referrals from physicain-investors.
Referrals of Medicare patients will be significantly curtailed by
the advent of Stark II. The Anti-Fraud Statute will continue to be
relevant for joint ventures that Stark I permits. Though the Fraud
Alert lays out a number of guidelines for physician-investors, it is not
yet clear how vigorously the OIG will seek compliance with them.
Because of the remaining gaps and uncertainties in federal law,
state legislation remains important. States would be wise to consider
community-need legislation that both safeguards against physician
self-referral and allows physicians to demonstrate a need for their in-
vestment on a case-by-case basis.
JENNIFER HERNDON PURYEAR
Public law of the State of New Jersey mandates that a physician, chiropractor
or podiatrist inform his patients of any significant financial interest he may have
in a health care service.
Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I do have a financial interest in the
following health care service(s) to which I refer my patients:
(list applicable health care services)
You may, of course, seek treatment at a health care service provider of your
own choice. A listing of alternative health care service providers can be found in
the classified section of your telephone directory under the appropriate heading.
Id. § 45:9-22.6.
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